Amid Libya’s ongoing crisis, unresolved disputes over citizenship haunt society and the fragile state. A significant number of people in Libya – presumably several hundred thousand – are not formally recognized as citizens, despite considering themselves as such. Commonly referred to as “persons of undetermined legal status”, the majority are first- or second-generation immigrants whose naturalisation process is on hold. A smaller amount consists of native inhabitants who have not been recognised by the state, as well as a group of people whose citizenship was revoked. Although they are registered with the authorities, their status does not guarantee them civil rights, thus curtailing their access to essential paperwork, public services and employment.
The issue is of national concern and there are people affected by it across the country; however, it is of particular magnitude in the South of Libya, where it feeds instability. After being on hold for decades, the citizenship file has recently been reopened through the draft constitution, and administrative authorities have taken a renewed interest. This provides a window of opportunity to revisit the causes of disputed citizenship and promote a problem-solving approach based on consultations and social dialogue, to mitigate the risk of further destabilisation.
The European Institute of Peace partnered with researcher Valerie Stocker to produce a policy paper that provides an overview of citizenship-related grievances in Libya. The paper traces the history of undetermined legal status and how citizenship disputes relate to Libya’s troubled transition. The author also examines approaches to tackle undetermined legal status, including through the proposed constitution, and offers recommendations for the challenges that lie ahead.
October 2018: The Islamic State (IS) may be on the back-foot in Iraq and Syria, but it retains various chapters across the globe. The Islamic State in Somalia is one of them; but beyond a general notion that it has established a presence, available analysis of IS’s capabilities, appeal, and trajectory remains scant. This report, produced by the European Institute of Peace together with The Global Strategy Network and Hiraal, sheds light on those aspects of IS across East Africa, with a prominent focus on Somalia.
Executive summary
The slogan of the Islamic State is remaining and expanding (baqiya wa tatamadad), and at the end of July 2018, the Islamic State in East Africa could claim to be doing both; not in any dramatic way, but sufficiently to be taken seriously by other violent extremist groups, and by government officials. From an unpromising start in 2015, the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) had survived an onslaught by its far more powerful rival, al Shabaab, and had established a secure base in Puntland. Furthermore, towards the end of 2017 and into 2018, it had begun to show operational capacity in Mogadishu, challenging the dominance of al Shabaab in the key battleground against the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).
However, the future trajectory of ISS remains uncertain, and much depends on when and if it becomes capable of mounting major, attention-grabbing attacks in Mogadishu or outside Somalia, and leveraging them to gain more support. Al Shabaab remains far stronger, and ISS will suffer if al Shabaab begins to see it as a greater challenge to its dominance, just as it will if the FGS and its international partners come to regard it as more than a distraction from the main insurgent threat. So far it has carved out some space and established a profile without altering the dynamic of the bigger war.
Potentially, ISS has a stronger appeal than al Shabaab. It is not mired in a static insurgency and does not suffer the lack of political credibility and religious legitimacy that dogs its rival. With a more inspiring leadership, ISS could fire up enough of the dispossessed and alienated youth of the region to cause a major problem. But for now it looks too much like a mini-al Shabaab; overly dependent on clan allegiances – a Darod alternative in the North to the Hawiye movement in the South; too locally focused, and offering little prospect of any major achievement. Its mission is obscure, and it shows little of the vitality, organisational flair and ability to horrify so typical of its parent body.
This could change if experienced fighters from elsewhere in the Islamic State ‘Caliphate’ joined its ranks and either took over or transformed its leadership. Few have made the journey so far, and there are more appealing destinations than Puntland for the survivors of the war in Iraq and Syria. But it would not take many to change perceptions of ISS and offer a rallying point for Islamic State supporters in DRC, Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania, as well as those in Somalia, and even in Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Yemen. If ISS can establish itself as the main Islamic State group in the Horn of Africa, providing leadership to other Islamic State offshoots and establishing sustainable links to the Islamic State leadership, perhaps through Yemen, it could yet grow to become a real security challenge for as long as the Islamic State brand remains strong.
So far, the prospect is remote, and support for ISS remains limited, fluid, and disorganised; but the FGS and the international community should remain alert and take what opportunities arise to weaken its structure, disrupt its growth and undermine its propaganda so as to ensure that it does not become a major problem. Inevitably, the future of ISS will depend as much on what happens around it as on its own internal development.
Solving conflicts always begins with analysis and research. Mediators not only need to understand the peace process; they also need to have a good grasp of the conflict itself. What is happening on the ground? What do conflict parties think (and want)? How does it all relate to wider local, regional and international political dynamics? Mediators and their teams spend considerable time to find answers to these sort of questions. Libya is no exception. By Elena Marda
Libya has made the headlines lately, mainly for the migratory flows coming from the country’s coastal areas and the fight against Daesh. The country’s porous borders have allowed for increased levels of transborder criminal activities, human trafficking and illicit smuggling. At the same time, violent extremist elements are taking advantage of the power vacuum created during the fighting. Despite progress at the national level, local peacemaking initiatives have so far only offered short term solutions a peaceful solution to Libya’s conflict remains pending. In addition, the polarised and fragmented political landscape further hinders understanding of the rapidly shifting alliances that occur in the country.
In a nutshell: Libya is a complex conflict which matters to Europe. There are multiple challenges for mediators and peacemakers – security, access, timing, location, level, coordination to name just a few. But how can we build sustainable peace? To understand the complexity of the conflict and the various political arenas we curated a few resources that go into some of the most difficult challenges mediators are confronted with. From local conflict dynamics to the role of Europe, from migrant smuggling to the future of Libyan oil.
CONFLICT DYNAMICS A few weeks ago, EIP hosted an event with Rebecca Murray, a Libya correspondent and Joost Hiltermann, MENA Director at the International Crisis Group on the situation in Libya and peace prospects in the country. The discussion focused on how Libyans see the current peacemaking efforts by the UN, the presence of violent extremism and its implications to regional stability, as well as stories from Libya’s tribal areas. Listen to the event chaired by EIP’s Executive Director Martin Griffiths:
LOCAL DYNAMICS The first part of this EUI paper on Libya looks into local conflict resolution efforts in Libya with tribal elders and notables acting as mediators in the Nafusa Mountains. It tells the story of the establishment of the ‘Libyan Social Dialogue’ in 2015 and its subsequent negotiations which was the result of continuous work between traditional mediation figures and youth social activists. Click here to read the publication.
ROLE OF EUROPE Intervening Better: Europe’s Second Chance in Libya. Mattia Toaldo from ECFR offers a comprehensive set of recommendations to European countries with an interest in Libya: economy, reconciliation, diplomacy and joint military and migration support are the main priority areas for the future. While the first intervention in Libya was not followed by an organised transitional period. In addition, the paper depicts the evolution and status of ISIS in Libya. Click here to read the paper. ECFR also produced this handy guide which explains the motives and interests of Libya’s main players.
ENERGY The Prize: Fighting for Libya’s Energy Wealth. Much has been said about Libya’s oil fields and the role that energy would play in the years to come. Many predict that Libyan oil could indeed satisfy the country’s domestic demand and it could contribute stability and eventually prosperity. However, militias and violent extremists have used oil fields as points of leverage in order to ameliorate their standing and military and capacity. Click here to read IGC’s paper published in 2015; it remains the most comprehensive report about the role of oil and gas in a future Libya.
MIGRATION Detained by Militias: Libya’s Migrant Trade Weak governance and the lack of functioning institutions were among the immediate repercussions for Libya’s society and economy following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi. This, coupled with the presence of aggressive and authoritarian regimes in a number of Sub-Saharan countries, opened the road for increased levels of smuggling activities through Libya. While trafficking of illicit goods was the norm during the Gaddafi era, in post-revolution Libya, migrant smuggling became the most lucrative business. From a final destination, Libya quickly turned to a transit point for Eritrean, Somalian and Nigerien migrants who attempt the dangerous trip into Europe. To get a glimpse of this reality it is worth watching this Vice News documentary that looks inside Libya’s detention facilities and contrasts the story of militias and with personal stories of migrants.
Tebu and Tuareg representatives met in Brussels to initiate peace talks for Awbari
The European Institute of Peace (EIP) hosted direct peace talks between representatives of the Tebu and Touareg, two groups involved in violent clashes in Southern Libya. Representatives of both groups met in Brussels on the 28th and 29th of July to discuss the conflict in Awbari. The two delegations described the intense negotiations in Brussels as ‘an important first step towards peace’. It was agreed to continue negotiations in Libya and work together for peace in the town of Awbari.They have since embarked on a plan of action to continue the peace process.
The delegations’ presence in Brussels was also used as an opportunity for them to brief the international community on the humanitarian and political situation in southern Libya.
The conflict in Awbari is part of Libya’s ongoing civil war which has also developed into a humanitarian crisis: There is a severe shortage of medical supplies and access to food and fuel is limited. The UN estimates that the conflict has so far resulted in 434000 internally displaced persons.
The talks were mediated by Promédiation and hosted by the European Institute of Peace (EIP).
Joint statement by Issa Ali Lamin and Alamin Aboubaker Akhaty Mohamed following the talks at EIP in Brussels:
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Communiqué Le 30 juillet 2015 à Bruxelles, Belgique
Nous, délégations des Toubous et Touaregs d’Oubari, après avoir signé une « déclaration de bonne volonté et d’initiative d’ouverture d’un processus de paix à Oubari », nous sommes retrouvé à Bruxelles les 28 et 29 juillet 2015.
Cette rencontre nous a permis d’entamer un dialogue direct entre nous, et de franchir une première étape importante sur le chemin de la paix. Nous avons pris, ensemble, l’engagement de poursuivre ce processus par étape, de manière à rétablir des conditions de sécurité à même de permettre, à terme, le déploiement d’une aide humanitaire pour l’ensemble des populations affectées par le conflit, et en particulier les personnes déplacées.
We, delegations of Tebus and Tuaregs of Awbari, after having signed a “Declaration of good will and of joint initiative to open a peace process in Awbari”, met in Brussels on the 28th and 29th of July 2015.
This meeting has allowed us to start a direct dialogue together, and to take an important first step towards peace. We jointly committed to pursue this process, step by step, in order to restore, in the end, conditions of security allowing humanitarian aid to deploy and assist all populations affected by the conflict in Awbari, in particular displaced people.
Chef de la délégation des Toubous/Head of Tebu delegation
Issa Ali Lamin
Chef de la délégation des Touaregs/Head of Tuareg delegation
Alamin Aboubaker Akhaty Mohamed
Amid Libya’s ongoing crisis, unresolved disputes over citizenship haunt society and the fragile state. A significant number of people in Libya – presumably several hundred thousand – are not formally recognized as citizens, despite considering themselves as such. Commonly referred to as “persons of undetermined legal status”, the majority are first- or second-generation immigrants whose naturalisation process is on hold. A smaller amount consists of native inhabitants who have not been recognised by the state, as well as a group of people whose citizenship was revoked. Although they are registered with the authorities, their status does not guarantee them civil rights, thus curtailing their access to essential paperwork, public services and employment.
The issue is of national concern and there are people affected by it across the country; however, it is of particular magnitude in the South of Libya, where it feeds instability. After being on hold for decades, the citizenship file has recently been reopened through the draft constitution, and administrative authorities have taken a renewed interest. This provides a window of opportunity to revisit the causes of disputed citizenship and promote a problem-solving approach based on consultations and social dialogue, to mitigate the risk of further destabilisation.
The European Institute of Peace partnered with researcher Valerie Stocker to produce a policy paper that provides an overview of citizenship-related grievances in Libya. The paper traces the history of undetermined legal status and how citizenship disputes relate to Libya’s troubled transition. The author also examines approaches to tackle undetermined legal status, including through the proposed constitution, and offers recommendations for the challenges that lie ahead.