The prospects for peace and stability in northeast Syria are, to say the least, complex. While the region remains caught in the sclerosis of the Syrian civil war, it is also subject to several regional and geopolitical tensions as well.
The most directly damaging aspect of this situation for the people of northeast Syria has been the terrifying impacts of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rule after 2014 and the violent conflict to oust the group. Most people know something about ISIS; many will also know about what ISIS did in northeast Syria during its war of aggression between 2014 and 2019. And yet, there has been almost no effort to listen directly to the victims of ISIS’ atrocities there. Unfortunately, eleven years of conflict in Syria have diminished interest in people’s plight, while the multi-layered political tensions that persist make genuine discussions about conditions inside the country difficult. And while there is a general appreciation that forces from the region fought bravely and effectively against ISIS, providing essential contributions to the defeat of ISIS after it swept across the region, there has been little done so far to speak of the tremendous cost paid by ordinary people in the region.
This report is intended as one step toward redressing that imbalance. It is a victim-centred report in the sense that it tries to understand how the war was experienced by people living in northeast Syria and the impact it has had on them. It is about the human cost—the effects on families and their children, education, and life chances; the impact on women’s daily lives; the disastrous consequences the conflict had on the local economy and the ability to simply make ends meet in already constrained conditions; and the deep psychological wounds that ISIS terror inflicted within these communities. It is true to say that all wars have these kinds of impacts, to a degree. But two things are notable in northeast Syria’s case: the brutality of ISIS terror and the relative failure to describe and address its human cost.
Why does this matter? There are several reasons.
The first is that there is value, even a duty, to humanise the realities and the costs of the war, including the long-term impact of atrocities suffered by civilians in the region. If we do not take the human cost seriously, our motivations to prevent their recurrence and restore stability are likely to be dulled. Telling the story as well as possible, and understanding the impact ISIS had, are important elements in this effort. For this reason, over half of this report is based on personal accounts and testimonies provided by ordinary people across northeast Syria through both individual and collective focus group interview processes.
Secondly, understanding the impact of the conflict is a necessary step in identifying both short- and long-term measures that, even within the political and economic constraints of the region, can help to address some of the fissures created by the conflict. While many of the headlines ISIS generated related to their gruesome executions and other brutal practices, their military campaigns and rule over communities in Syria and Iraq left behind much deeper scars. Thematic chapters by subject experts on the economic, educational, gender and psycho-social impacts represent one of the most detailed efforts to date to explain the nature of ISIS’ impacts on the area.
It may be tempting to think that northeast Syria found peace after ISIS’ military defeat in 2019. However, this would be to misunderstand the nature and impact of the conflict.
The ISIS threat has not been entirely extinguished. This much was clear during the research process that contributed to this report: many interviewees were fearful of violence at the hands of underground ISIS cells that embedded themselves into local communities during and after the group’s territorial collapse. The group’s use of sleeper cells and active local-level terror cells is well-documented. Some suggest that their continued presence in northeast Syria indicates that ISIS could re-emerge as a significant threat once again in the future. That threat casts a pall over society.
Even then, the war introduced toxicities that continue to affect communities across the northeast. Particularly in more rural areas, attitudes in relation to women and openness to different religious beliefs have become noticeably more closed and less tolerant.
In addition, a great deal of focus and effort, both economically and politically, remain tied up in the aftermath of the ISIS conflict. Al-Hol camp went from a refugee population of 12,000 people to a staggering 76,000 in a matter of months after the fall of Baghouz in 2019; the camp represents a humanitarian catastrophe as well as a persistent security threat. Prisons in the region still house some 20,000 former ISIS fighters, including around two thousand non-Syrians.
The effort to recognise and take seriously the human costs of ISIS rule in northeast Syria does three things: 1. it acknowledges people’s suffering; 2. it identifies the physical, mental, tangible and intangible wounds that need tending; and 3. it provides a timely caution about the need to take smarter, quicker steps to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict that prevent genuine recovery from taking place.
As such, this report represents one of the first opportunities for the people of northeast Syria themselves to formally discuss the incidents and impacts of the conflict, serving as a reminder that they are not merely statistics, disempowered victims, or collateral damage. They are real people with real lives who have suffered grievously.
At the same time, this report does not pretend to be an instrument of accountability. It does not seek to identify those responsible or offer evidence in their pursuit. That those responsible for atrocities should be brought to justice is axiomatic. The mechanisms for doing so, however, are not yet quite so obvious. Jails in the region hold tens of thousands of male suspects, and the political situation does not lend it itself to locally-held trials being recognised or the countries where suspects came from agreeing to host convicted individuals. These are matters that need addressing but are not within the scope of this report.
In recent decades, there has been much interest in the idea of truth commissions. The logic behind establishing those kinds of commissions was, at least partly, to help restore trust in authorities who may have been engaged in violations. The post-ISIS context confounds this aim in that the violations addressed here were carried out by ISIS, not by those who oversaw the territory then or who oversee it now. Indeed, many of those individuals themselves suffered directly at the hands of ISIS.
That the report is like some kinds of commissions of inquiry is true, but it takes place in a context where much of what might be asked is already known—we know who ISIS were, where they came from, what they appeared to want, and how they sought to obtain it. As such, the report addresses these issues in its introductory chapter, using already well-established research and analysis. In the same way that we know who carried out the atrocities, we also know why this was done.
The many people who have participated in this effort have done so in the knowledge that it will not change their lives in any direct fashion. They have experienced the harshest realities that life has to offer and have seen that the political capacity to react to these atrocities is extremely limited. Expectations are low as far as material change is concerned. On the other hand, those who worked on this project have noted the positive impact that the simple act of acknowledgment has had for many of those who suffered at the hands of ISIS.
This report is not exhaustive. Limitations of time and resources, as well as security constraints, limited the scope of the project. The challenging work of compiling the report has not gone unnoticed by ISIS, who have made their feelings and intentions known directly to several people who worked on it.
Surely, many tens of thousands of people affected by ISIS crimes could have participated in a much longer process if this were possible. But the report speaks for them as well. It tells a compelling and powerful story of the human and social costs of the ISIS war in northeast Syria. It acknowledges that suffering was caused to real people with real lives and hopes, people with jobs, families, husbands and wives, boyfriends and girlfriends; people with worries and dreams. Their lives were torn apart and brutalised. At a minimum, the report seeks to acknowledge and explain the real impact of what happened in northeast Syria. If possible, it also hopes to play a role in catalysing the necessary efforts to help address the aftermath of the barbarous tragedy that ISIS unleashed in the region.