By declaring its caliphate, ISIS assigned itself responsibility for the governance of territories under its control. Its proclaimed goal was to “cleanse” Islam by recreating the world and customs of the earliest Muslims living in the 7th century Middle East.[1] In July 2014, the very first issue of ISIS‘ propaganda magazine Dabiq— titled ‘The Return of the Khalifah’—stated that the group’s calling was to purge the world of apostasy and disbelief in order to bring political, geographical and spiritual unity (tawhid) to the Muslim community (ummah). ISIS saw pious Sunni communities as subdued and believed it would bring about a “true” Islamic society, led by a caliph and governed under Shari’a law. Only then would Muslims be able to live under the true rules of God (as interpreted by ISIS).
Intrinsic to its worldview was the belief that other communities (whether Shi’a, Yazidi, Alawi, Druze, Shabak, or Christian) and anyone else proclaimed to be a sinner were a hindrance to the fulfilment of the Muslim community’s full potential. With an interpretation of Islam like that of Zarqawi, ISIS believed that such groups could justifiably be eradicated. Extreme forms of violence, if committed against other sects, ethnicities, or so-called sinners thereby became an act of purification of a religion that had supposedly lost its way and become heretical.[2] ISIS promoted an uncompromising understanding of the Salafi creed, and Muslims who held the wrong beliefs could and must be killed. Experts noted that even amongst Salafi-jihadi groups, ISIS’ exclusionary stance was unprecedented.[3] Exclusion through violence served to create an in-group identity between Muslims of different nationalities and ethnicities who had joined the so-called “caliphate.”[4]
The need to provide territorial governance affected the structure of the organisation. In general terms, ISIS’ governing structures consisted of three separate internal groups.[5] The core leadership, headed by Baghdadi, presided over the military, administrative and religious arms of the organisation. Many of the leadership were former Ba’athist military officers who had been alienated by Maliki’s politics in post-Saddam Iraq.[6] The second group were ordinary Syrians and Iraqis, mostly Sunnis, who had pledged loyalty for military, financial, or ideological reasons and held administrative and military positions. The third group were foreign fighters, economically and socially alienated youth drawn by a supposedly revolutionary and romantic cause. By 2014, the US estimated that ISIS had between 20,000 and 31,500 members; by late 2015, at least 30,000 foreign fighters from 86 countries had joined its ranks.[7] As opposed to Nusra, whose leadership was almost exclusively Syrian, ISIS often appointed foreign fighters to senior positions and rewarded them with benefits unavailable to ordinary Syrian or Iraqi fighters.[8]
Following a thorough review of documents and letters drafted by ISIS leaders, the UN team investigating ISIS crimes (UNITAD) found that ISIS employed a ‘very centralized, top-down approach to the administration of territory that it held.’[9] Below Baghdadi, ISIS operated a division between two deputies for its respective Syrian and Iraqi operations, with former Iraqi military commander Abu Ali al-Anbari in charge of operations in Syria while Abu Muslim al-Turkmani oversaw Iraq.[10] Administrative control was exercised by ISIS’ “delegated committee,” which reported directly to Baghdadi and enjoyed broad administrative powers, such as overseeing the provinces or wilayat.[11] With Raqqa and Mosul as the respective centres of gravity in Syria and Iraq, responsibilities were further delegated among governors for the management of certain towns or villages.[12]
ISIS’ governance model in territories under its control could be broadly divided into two categories: administrative measures and the delivery of “Islamic” services. Administration included: da’wa, or religious outreach, which was one of the first services ISIS provided upon entering a territory; the establishment of Shari’a institutions; the creation of hisba (religious morality police) who patrolled the cities to promote virtue and prevent vice; and education services using a curriculum focused on Islamic sciences and study of the Quran. ISIS also established Islamic courts to resolve disputes (based on its ultra-conservative interpretation of Shari’a) and administer hudud, severe punishments such as stoning or flogging. Local police forces worked as executive forces for the courts tasked with maintaining internal security in towns and detention centres.[13] Further tasks included military recruitment, including training for children as the “Cubs of Zarqawi,” and public relations and tribal affairs.[14] Islamic services, on the other hand, were mostly related to the provision of aid and basic services to the population under its control. This included infrastructure projects, humanitarian assistance, the maintenance of bakeries to provide subsidised bread to local populations, and the supply of water and electricity.[15] ISIS also operated bus services, postal services, healthcare and vaccination programmes for children, and soup kitchens.[16] Many of these services were free but subject to severe shortages.
Footnotes
[1] Cole Bunzel, ‘From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State’ (Brookings Institute, 2015).
[2] Pieter Nanninga, ‘“Cleansing the Earth of the Stench of Shirk”: The Islamic State’s Violence as Acts of Purification’ (2019) Vol.7 Journal of Religion and Violence pp. 128–57.
[3] Graeme Wood, The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State (New York, Random House, 2016).
[4] N. Lovrics, ‘The Spectacles of Experience: Toward a New Understanding of ISIS’s Performative Violence’ (2015) Vol.2 New Sociological Perspectives; S.T. Zech & Z. Kelly, ‘Off with their Heads: The Islamic State and Civilian Beheadings’ (2015) Vol.6 Journal of Terrorism Research pp.83-93.
[5] UN Security Council, S/2014/815, para.13.
[6] Coles & Parker, “How Saddam’s men help Islamic State rule’.
[7] Al Jazeera English, ‘CIA says IS numbers underestimated’ (Qatar, 12 September 2014) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/9/12/cia-says-is-numbers-underestimated> accessed 7 June 2023); European Parliament, Foreign Fighters – Member State responses and EU Action (Brussels, 2016) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-579080-Foreign-fighters-rev-FINAL.pdf> accessed 7 June 2023.
[8] UN Security Council, S/2014/815, paras. 16 & 19; Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds, ‘ISIS Governance in Syria’ in Middle East Security Report 22 (ISW, 2014), p.23-23, <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS_Governance.pdf> accessed 7 June 2023.
[9] UNITAD, 9th report, S/2022/836, para.48.
[10] UN Security Council, S/2014/815, para.16.
[11] Thomas Jocelyn, ‘State Department adds chair of Islamic State’s delegated committee to terror list’ (Long War Journal, 21 November 2018) <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/11/state-department-adds-chair-of-islamic-states-delegated-committee-to-terror-list.php> accessed 7 June 2023.
[12] UN Security Council, S/2014/815, para.15.
[13] Caris & Reynolds, ‘ISIS Governance in Syria’ p.15-19.
[14] Ibid, p.2.
[15] Ibid, p.20-23.
[16] Charles Lister, Profiling the Islamic State (Brooking Doha Center, 2014) <https://www.brookings.edu/research/profiling-the-islamic-state/> accessed 7 June 2023, p.28.