ISIS first originated in Iraq. One individual inextricably linked with ISIS was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian born as Ahmad Fadil al-Khalayleh.[1] Just before the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, Zarqawi had joined the Afghan mujahideen, who had enjoyed Saudi, Pakistani and US support throughout the Eighties as anti-communist fighters combatting the Soviet invasion of the country.[2]

After military training in Afghanistan, Zarqawi later returned to Jordan, where, in March 1994, he was arrested. Zarqawi was further radicalised in prison and following his release in 1999, he obtained funding from al-Qaida to set up a training camp in Herat, in western Afghanistan. The Salafi-jihadist militant group, headed by Osama bin Laden, had already bombed US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and would soon gain global infamy for their role in the attacks in the United States of America on 11 September 2001.

After the US invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, Zarqawi relocated his operations to northeast Iraq.[3] By the summer of 2004, Zarqawi was thought to be behind a series of terrorist attacks in Iraq, including car bombings targeting the Jordanian embassy, the UN’s Baghdad headquarters, as well as various Shi’a shrines.[4]

Zarqawi did not apply for official membership of al-Qaida until October 2004. In a letter to al-Qaida‘s leadership, the Jordanian outlined his eschatological interpretation of Islam and strategic objectives for al-Qaida in Iraq.[5] Zarqawi’s narrow definition of who constituted a Muslim and his concern with excommunication, or takfir, would later underpin ISIS’ ideology and extreme political violence. Mainstream takfir is the declaration that a Muslim has become an apostate or heretic (murtad) by practicing idolatry or polytheism (shirk), engaging in an act or belief that is either seen as disbelief (kafr) in Islam or that brands a person an infidel (kafir) who has only pretended to be a Muslim.[6] Takfir is punishable by death in Islam and results in further punishment in the afterlife; however, traditionally, takfir has rarely been applied in Islamic history, as the practice can have grave consequences for both the accuser and the accused.[7]

Zarqawi—and later ISIS—applied the term kufar broadly to include Muslims who committed sin, rulers who did not rule according to Islamic Shari’a, Muslims belonging to groups other than theirs, or Muslims who did not migrate from non-Muslim lands into the group’s self-proclaimed “caliphate.” This hardline interpretation, zealously pursued since the days of Zarqawi, sees Islam as plagued by disbelief, polytheism and heresy, and claims that Islam must be “cleansed” by recreating the world and customs of the earliest Muslims—the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) and his companions—in the 7th century AD. Zarqawi saw Shi’a Muslims as Islam’s “enemy within,” referring to them as “traitorous apostates” (al-murtadin al-kha’inin) who made up a so-called “community of renegade deviation” (ahl al-zigh al-mariqiin) and embraced idolatry and polytheism.[8]

Although al-Qaida’s leaders were wary of this radically sectarian approach, they accepted Zarqawi’s pledge of allegiance and decided that he would lead a new affiliate, al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI).[9] AQI emerged as an important actor in the ensuing civil war in Iraq, conducting terror attacks during the 2005 elections and explicitly targeting Shi’a civilians and religious sites across the country that caused severe civilian casualties.[10] It did not take long for this to cause a serious disagreement between al-Qaida’s leadership and AQI. Al-Qaeda’s number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, questioned AQI’s attacks on “ordinary Shi’a” and stressed the need to expel US forces from Iraq and secure the support of the Sunni community before establishing an Islamic emirate.[11] Zarqawi defied al-Qaida’s central leadership and, in April 2006, announced that an Islamic state would be established in three months.[12]


Footnotes

[1] Toby Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS, (Kindle edition, 2015) ch.2.

[2] Michael Weiss & Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (Kindle edition, 2015), ch.1.

[3] Warrick, Black Flags, ch.4.

[4] NBC, ‘Terror strikes blamed on al-Zarqawi in Iraq’ (14 July 2004) <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna5437742> accessed 7 June 2023.

[5] US Department of State, ‘Zarqawi letter’ (February 2004) <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm> accessed 7 June 2023.

[6] Muhammad Haniff Hassan, ‘The Danger of Takfir (Excommunication): Exposing IS Takfiri Ideology(2017) Vol.9 Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, p.3.

[7] Joas Wagemakers, Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.226.

[8] Primarily, Zarqawi draws on Taqī ad-Dīn Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah (died 1323)—a favourite of all Salafi-Jihadi movements—for both legalistic and historical justification of this exclusion. Ibn Taymiyyah, like Zarqawi, saw the Shi’a as an ‘enemy within’; he blamed them for the downfall of the Abbasid Caliphate during the Mongol invasion and justified violence against the Shi’a through takfir. Ibn Taymiyyah has been described as the intellectual father of casual takfir, the main legal and ideological mechanism for ISIS’ violent persecution of other sects. See: Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (Norton, New York, 2006), p.71.

[9] Will McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (Kindle edition, 2006), ch.1.

[10] While the US military blamed Zarqawi and AQI as the primary movers in the growing Iraqi insurgency, it conducted psychological operations to highlight the role of the Jordanian terrorist and downplay the role of domestic support for the insurgency. In reality, however, there were several factors fanning the flames of the insurgency: the growing alienation of Iraq’s Sunni population (previously the dominant political force under Saddam Hussein); Shi’a resistance to the US occupation; abuses by the US-led coalition such as the destruction of Fallujah (which would later be one of the first Iraqi cities conquered by ISIS) and torture at Abu Ghraib prison; widespread corruption throughout Iraq; and ill-fated decisions by the Coalition Provisional Authority to disband the Iraqi army and “de-Baathify” the government, thereby ensuring there were between 65,000 and 95,000 well-armed Iraqis that militant groups opposed to the coalition could feasibly work with.
See: Tim Dickinson, ‘Hyping Zarqawi’ (Rolling Stone, 12 April 2006) <https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/hyping-zarqawi-244415/> accessed 7 June 2023; Patrick Cockburn, The Occupation: War And Resistance In Iraq (2007);Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada: Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival & the Struggle for Iraq (2008);Antony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War (2006); Seymour Hersh, ‘Torture at Abu Ghraib’ The New Yorker (New York, 30 April 2004) <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib> accessed 7 June 2023; James P. Pfifner ‘US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army’ (2010) Vol.25 Intelligence & National Security, pp.76-85.

[11] Document available here: <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-Translation.pdf> accessed 7 June 2023.

[12] McCants, ISIS Apocalypse, ch.1.